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MANAGING THE INTRODUCTION OF 
NEW	AND	HIGH-COST	DRUGS	
IN CHALLENGING TIMES: 
THE EXPERIENCE OF HUNGARY 
AND POLAND
By: Danica Kwong, Alessandra Ferrario, Jakub Adamski, András Inotai and Zoltán Kaló
Summary: Hungary and Poland are currently facing budgetary 
pressures to reduce health and pharmaceutical spending. However, 
they still must ensure that valuable innovative medicines are made 
available to patients. Risk-sharing schemes (RSSs) are a mechanism 
to achieve access, particularly for high-cost innovative medicines 
that payers might be reluctant to fund because of uncertainty 
around their cost-effectiveness in real life. RSSs can be designed 
to distribute financial risks, risks relating to health outcomes or a 
combination of both. Due to fiscal imperatives and complexities linked 
to the implementation of health outcome-based schemes, both 
countries have focused mainly on financial RSSs.
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In the recent difficult economic climate, 
many governments are cutting health and 
pharmaceutical budgets as part of wide-
ranging austerity measures. Expenditure 
on drugs is particularly viewed as a major 
driver of health spending  1  and thus an 
attractive target for spending cuts.
These pressures have compelled payers 
to implement a wide range of cost 
containment measures on pharmaceuticals. 
In Europe, a number of countries reported 
the immediate implementation of policies 
such as enforced price cuts, as well as 
changes in co-payment levels, VAT rates 
on medicines and distribution margins. 2 
On top of the difficult economic 
circumstances all of Europe is facing, 
Central Eastern European countries 
such as Hungary and Poland must 
simultaneously deal with additional 
challenges. These include manufacturers 
imposing the same pharmaceutical price 
levels as for higher-income European 
countries as a tactic to avoid low prices 
spilling over through international 
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reference pricing and parallel import 
practices, 3  in addition to pressures to 
reduce overall deficit.
An additional consideration is that the 
increasing proportion of the non-working 
population (including the unemployed, 
older people and disabled) in these 
countries also has implications for 
their social health insurance financing 
structures; shrinking payroll contributions 
could result in fewer available funds to 
spend on health.
‘‘ Both countries employ a swathe of payback measures
Against this backdrop of austerity, 
however, payers and health ministries 
maintain a responsibility to provide access 
to valuable innovative medicines  4  for 
patients in need, even if these medicines 
are costly. To address this need, payers are 
increasingly employing mechanisms that 
require pharmaceutical manufacturers to 
share the risk of reimbursing and making 
available these new medicines, particularly 
with regards to high-cost new oncology 
and immunomodulating medicines.
These mechanisms are aptly known as 
managed-entry schemes (or sometimes 
more narrowly defined as risk-sharing 
schemes, though not all of them include 
a risk-sharing component).
Reimbursement structures and 
processes
The Hungarian and Polish reimbursement 
systems share many similarities.
The financing of new innovative 
medicines rests respectively with the 
Hungarian National Health Insurance 
Fund (NHIF) and the Polish National 
Health Fund (NHF). The decisions on 
whether to publicly fund them are made 
by the Reimbursement Department at the 
NHIF and the Polish Ministry of Health.
Health technology assessments (HTAs) 
are mandated as a prerequisite to the 
reimbursement negotiation process of new 
medicines in both countries; these are 
conducted respectively by the National 
Institute for Quality and Organisational 
Development in Health Care and 
Medicines in Hungary and the Agency for 
Health Technology Assessment in Poland 
(AHTAPol). Of note, the published cost-
effectiveness thresholds in both Hungary 
(2 – 3x Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
per capita/Quality Adjusted Life Year 
(QALY)  5 ) and Poland (3x GDP per capita/
QALY or Life Year Gained  6 ) are intended 
as soft reference points. Manufacturers 
may apply for reimbursement at any 
price that they feel to be justified; but in 
practice, applications should be submitted 
with a cost-effectiveness claim deemed 
‘acceptable’ (acceptability being loosely 
based around the threshold) to enhance 
the likelihood of the medicine being 
accepted for positive reimbursement. 
In reality however, Hungary and Poland, 
like many other countries, tend to consider 
budget impact more strongly than cost-
effectiveness in reimbursement decision-
making.
Later we discuss risk-sharing schemes as a 
mechanism to achieve access, particularly 
in the case of high-cost innovative 
medicines that payers might be reluctant 
to fund because of perceived uncertainty 
around their cost-effectiveness.
Pharmaceutical cost containment 
strategies
Both countries have recently enacted 
drastic economic reform plans with 
significant implications for pharmaceutical 
expenditure. In 2011, the Hungarian 
government introduced a structural reform 
plan (Széll Kálmán plan) with the intention 
to meet obligations from the European 
Union relating to the country’s excessive 
deficit. Within this plan, the stated aim is 
to reduce public pharmaceutical spending 
by over 35% during 2012 – 2014. 7 
In 2012, Poland introduced the latest 
Reimbursement Act to fully implement 
the European transparency directive as 
well as to alleviate budgetary pressures. 
To that effect, the Act introduced several 
mechanisms to decrease pharmaceutical 
expenditure – most notably: basing 
statutory prices on mandatory 
negotiations; setting price limits for 
generic drugs and drugs which have lost 
their marketing exclusivity (both at 75% 
of the original price); and introducing 
adjusted fixed wholesale and retail mark-
ups. To date, the Act seems to be serving 
its purpose by providing savings to the 
Polish NHF, both by applying downward 
pressures on prices as well as reducing the 
level of reimbursement to the pharmacy 
sector paid by the NHF; however, it is 
noteworthy that NHF spending on high-
cost hospital drugs did increase under 
the Act. The Act also made progress 
on increasing access to medicines, 
introducing measures such as mandatory 
bi-monthly reviews of the reimbursement 
lists which resulted in 13 updates to 
the list in 2012 and 2013 (compared to 
the 13 updates that occurred during the 
entire period of 2005 – 2011).
Both countries employ a wide swathe 
of payback measures to contain 
pharmaceutical spending which are 
either implemented in relation to 
individual products (e.g. clawback) or 
therapeutic groups (payback based on 
market share). A general pharmaceutical 
budget ceiling is also designated in both 
countries as an additional safety measure; 
when expenditure exceeds the ceiling, 
industry is required to pay back a certain 
proportion. In Hungary, the ceiling is 
designed so that when it is exceeded 
by 10% or more, industry must pay 
back 100% of the excess consumption. In 
Poland, pharmaceutical companies must 
cover 50% of the overspend if the ceiling 
(17% of NHF’s total health budget  8 ) is 
exceeded. The payback is shared across 
companies that have received a larger 
reimbursement amount in comparison to 
the previous year; the distribution among 
these companies is calculated on a ‘per 
product’ basis taking into account the ratio 
of each company’s price to the product 
which sets the reimbursement limit in 
the group. Thus far, the effectiveness of 
other cost-containment measures in both 
Hungary and Poland has meant that the 
ceilings have never been reached.
It is salient to note that across both 
countries, engaging in a risk-sharing 
scheme exempts manufacturers from 
general paybacks.
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Utilisation of risk-sharing schemes 
in Hungary and Poland
Risk-sharing schemes (RSSs) are a 
relatively novel mechanism available 
to payers for financing innovative 
medicines that are high-cost. While RSSs 
have been implemented by a number of 
countries in recent years, there is not 
yet a consensus amongst policy-makers 
on their appropriateness or their utility 
relative to administrative burden. This 
is in part due to the diversity of RSS 
types and their varied implementation 
across countries; but above all, it is due 
to a lack of data suitable for evaluation. 
However, as an alternative to pure cost 
containment strategies (for example, 
mandatory price reductions), RSSs 
have potential advantages as a longer-
term, more sustainable framework that 
distributes risk between the payer and 
the manufacturer to further their mutual 
goal of facilitating patient access to new 
medicines. RSSs can be designed to 
distribute financial risks, risks relating 
to the outcome or performance of the 
treatment not being as expected in real 
life, or a combination of both financial 
and performance uncertainty.
Financial schemes aim to minimise the 
risks to the payer in making a positive 
reimbursement decision and publicly 
financing the new medicine. Examples 
of commonly used financial RSSs in the 
two countries include:
•  price-volume schemes: a volume of 
sales related to a target population 
is negotiated; the manufacturer will 
offer a rebate or discount on any sales 
exceeding the predetermined threshold
•  confidential discounts: manufacturers 
agree on discounts independently with 
reimbursement authorities in each 
country without having to reduce the 
official list price of the drug
•  dose/volume capping: manufacturers 
offer discounts or even full rebates after 
an agreed spending or volume threshold 
is reached; thresholds can be set on 
overall levels or per patient.
While information about the number or 
details of RSSs is held in commercial 
confidence in the two countries, some 
information is available.




In Poland, the most commonly proposed 
RSSs in reimbursement applications 
in 2012 were confidential discounts 
(34.61%), various price-volume schemes 
(11.54%) or payback schemes (23.08%) and 
others (26.92%). 9  Confidential discounts 
comprise the majority of schemes, 
serving both as a way to diminish cost 
to the payer and as a counter-measure 
for manufacturers against external 
reference pricing. Such conditions are 
most commonly concluded for drugs 
purchased directly by hospitals or used in 
drug programmes; payers want a discount 
from the high cost of these products and 
manufacturers benefit from the ease of 
concealing the price in the purchases 
through tenders. The paybacks are 
settled directly between the companies 
and the NHF. Due to the specifics of 
inpatient hospital treatment (a relatively 
small number of patients and health 
service providers allowing for effective 
monitoring of the treatment and gathering 
of data), it is reasonable to predict that 
most future schemes will be concluded for 
inpatient medicines.
It is worth noting that the Minister of 
Health recognises the value of RSSs, 
and tries to incentivise pharmaceutical 
companies by allowing an exemption from 
general payback schemes if companies 
propose and engage in such schemes. At 
the same time, companies may be fined by 
the Minister of Health if the risk-sharing 
conditions are not met.
Within the Hungarian context, price 
volume schemes are mandatory for all 
innovative drugs reimbursed from the 
pharmacy budget of the NHIF. Different 
volume restrictions are applied for hospital 
products, so that risk is shared not only 
with pharmaceutical companies, but also 
with hospitals. Of note, volume restrictions 
have not always been successful in 
meeting patient needs; the volumes 
reimbursed are often insufficient, leading 
to unequal access across the country.
Further potential for RSSs 
in the future
To date, both countries have focused 
mainly on financial RSSs. Stakeholders 
cite lack of administrative capacity, 
infrastructure and political will as 
obstacles to attempting outcomes-
based RSSs.
In comparison to financial schemes where 
the overarching objective is to manage 
budget impact with limited consideration 
of the real-life added value of introducing 
the drug, outcomes-based schemes aim 
to achieve true risk sharing between 
the two parties by linking current, 
or future, reimbursement to real-life 
effectiveness. Coverage with evidence 
development (CED) schemes recognise 
that efficacy data from clinical trials is 
often insufficient to accurately gauge 
Table 1: Financial risk-sharing schemes in Hungary and Poland
Hungary Poland
Price-volume schemes Yes; generally applied for all new pharmacy drugs Yes
Confidential discounts Yes Yes
Dose/volume capping Yes Yes
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utilisation or cost-effectiveness in real-life 
clinical practice. In CED schemes, real-
life data are collected during the initial 
reimbursement period, after which the 
reimbursement status may be adjusted 
based on the drug’s performance and 
utilisation in real life.
‘‘ Price volume schemes are mandatory for all innovative pharmacy drugs
In an outcome guarantee (also commonly 
known as payment-by-results) scheme, 
the manufacturer would offer a rebate or 
a discount if the drug does not achieve 
a predetermined outcome level. As 
yet, few countries have fully embraced 
health outcomes-based risk sharing. 
This is certainly understandable within 
the current economic climate; payers 
are compelled to focus on containing 
budget impact and certainly would face 
difficulties in setting up and maintain 
resource-intensive data collection 
registries. In Hungary, a framework for 
such schemes was actually developed 
in 2010 but application of the framework 
has been stalled. Poland’s capacity to 
monitor outcomes-based schemes is 
limited at the moment. In 2012, 3.85% of 
the 26 RSS proposed included a payment 
by result element. 9  There are some isolated 
registries maintained privately or by non 
governmental organisations (NGOs) 
for certain diseases, but there have not 
been efforts from public institutions to 
coordinate data-sharing. There is some 
push to set up electronic prescribing and 
registries, but bureaucratic delays are 
undermining timely implementation.
As RSSs are a relatively new mechanism, 
there is certainly room for creativity and 
innovation. In recognition of the political 
constraints on governments in the current 
economy, manufacturers could propose 
risk-sharing arrangements and offer to 
set up and fund monitoring registries 
for outcomes-based schemes. Such 
arrangements would especially appeal to 
health ministries if manufacturers were 
to set up registries that integrate into and 
strengthen existing data collection systems 
(rather than standalone drug-specific 
monitoring projects). Outcomes-based 
routes could prove advantageous to the 
manufacturer rather than yielding to 
discounts or other financial arrangements.
There is not yet a general consensus within 
the policy community on whether RSSs 
are a good method to achieve the mutual 
goals of payers and industry, nor has 
there been a systematic evaluation of their 
impact. In the case of Hungary and Poland, 
governments are facing budget constraints 
and patients are facing reduced access to 
medicines; thus new policy tools such as 
RSSs that potentially allow for rational 
spending, while ensuring patient access 
to new medicines, should be attempted 
implemented, evaluated and considered in 
a committed manner.
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